Abstract-Key Management Protocols (KMPs) are intended to manage cryptographic keys in a cryptosystem. KMPs have been standardized for Internet Protocol Security (IPsec), and these KMPs have been formally validated for their security properties. In the Internet, routing protocols have different requirements on their KMPs, which are not met by the existing IPsec KMPs, such as IKE, IKEv2, and GDOI. Protocol modeling has been used to analyze the security of the IPsec KMPs. For routing protocols, there are new KMPs proposed by the Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) working group of the Internet Engineering Task Force: RKMP, MRKM, and MaRK. These KMPs are designed to have better applicability for general routing protocols. However, the security of these protocols has not been validated. In this paper, we have summarized the necessary conditions for security of routing protocols. We have analyzed the security aspects of RKMP, MRKM, and MaRK, by formally validating those protocols using the AVISPA modeling tool. This has shown that these KMPs meet the necessary security requirements.
I. INTRODUCTION
Routers are used for managing the flow of data through the Internet. They use a routing protocol to determine the best route; this involves the exchange of messages with peer routers. The data that are flowing may contain personal information or business secrets with significant value. Although the data themselves may be encrypted to protect them, it is also important to ensure that the routers that are handling these data are legitimate. Therefore we must ensure that the peer exchanges are secure, and that the peer routers are authenticated.
Security of the peer exchanges among routers for a particular routing protocol has two aspects: 1) A security mechanism for the exchanges 2) A Key Management Protocol (KMP) to negotiate the parameters to be used during the exchanges. Security mechanisms for routing protocol exchanges have been specified by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) for each standardized routing protocol. While several KMPs have been standardized for particular kinds of secure exchanges, none has been standardized for the area of secure routing. However, recent work in the Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) Working Group of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has resulted in proposals for KMPs for this area [1] . Validations of the security of many standardized KMPs have been done, but to our knowledge no validation of the security of the KARP proposals has been attempted.
We have modeled the operation of the KARP proposals using a security-oriented protocol validation tool called AVISPA [2] , and then designed several experiments to analyze their security, to see if these protocols meet the general requirements for routing security.
This paper is structured as follows: Section II outlines previous work in routing protocols and their security. This is followed by a brief introduction of key management protocols (KMP). Section III presents the specific problem that we are going to solve. Section IV presents our definition of "security", in the context of routing protocols. Section V gives the details of several scenarios we designed to better analyze the problem. Section VI demonstrates the validation of our proposed model using AVISPA, and gives a summary analysis. Finally, we give the conclusion in Section VII.
II. PREVIOUS WORK

A. Routing Protocol Security
The wide use of the Internet nowadays has created a great challenge to information security. Routing protocols are used to exchange the topological information among routers within a single network or between different networks. According to the topological information, routers are able to select the best paths to forward packets, i.e., these associated with the least cost. Without the correct routing information, the forwarding of packets could be inefficient, or cause unreachable destinations. This makes the security of routing protocols into a crucial problem that must be dealt with.
For routing security, a routing protocol needs to make sure of the authenticity of each of the peer routers and also the integrity of the packets that they exchange. In order to achieve that, most routing protocols use keys (or a shared secret) to authenticate the peers and use different kinds of security mechanisms to protect the packets from being modified.
There are many different security mechanisms used by routing protocols. For example, the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [3] relies on the transport subsystem to provide security services. Protocol Independent Multicast -Sparse Mode [4] specifies IPsec to provide its security. Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) [5] specifies either an Authentication Trailer, or IPsec.
B. Key Management
As noted previously, IPsec is used in a number of cases to provide the security mechanisms. For a particular instance of IPsec, the parameters of the interaction form a Security Association (SA).
Key/SA management not only manages the keys, it also includes various security parameters, such as the cryptographic algorithms, the lifetime of the keys and which shared materials are used to derive the key.
There is large number of routing protocols that are used in different areas. However, the KMPs are relatively few. We will consider two classes of KMPs: those intended to work with IPsec, and those intended to satisfy the needs of routing protocols. As we mentioned before, IPsec is used in a number of cases to provide the security mechanisms. For a particular instance of IPsec, the parameters of the interaction form a Security Association (SA) or a Group SA (GSA). Among all the KMPs we mentioned above, IKE (either version 1 or version 2) is just a protocol in the IPsec protocol suite. It is limited to doing key management for the IPsec protocols, and models and security analyses are available on the AVISPA website [2] . GDOI uses IKE and other technologies to achieve group key management. Similar to IKE, related work of GDOI has been done including the modelling and analysis [6] .
On the other hand, compared to IKE and GDOI, the KMPs proposed by the KARP working group (RKMP, MRKM and MaRK) have some significant differences. RKMP and IKE are both for key management in unicast communication. RKMP carries more payloads to adapt to different network environments, while IKE can only be deployed over IPsec. For GDOI and MaRK, in addition to the payloads, MaRK also adds the election mechanism that allows the GC/KS to be self-elected by group members within the same group. This election mechanism MaRK added provides the self-healing ability to the system when certain incidents happen (e.g., GC/KS crash, group member be compromised) and increase the tolerance of errors. All the detailed design and explanations of RKMP [7] , MRKM [8] and MaRK [9] could be found in related KARP documents. However, there is no work that has been done to analyze their security. This work is achieved in this paper.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Many Key Management Protocols exist for negotiating keys and other Security Association parameters for IPsec. For instance, Internet Key Exchange (IKE, sometimes IKEv1 or IKEv2, depending on version) is the protocol used to set up a security association (SA) between two peers in the IPsec protocol suite [10] . Also, Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) is a cryptographic protocol that takes advantage of IKE and establishes a security association among group members to do the group key management. Since IKEv2 has already been formally modeled and proved to be secure, and GDOI uses the technology of IKE to establish the security association, we have enough reasons to believe GDOI has reached the same secure level as well.
However, for the routing protocols that use other mechanisms (e.g., AT, TCP-AO), the IPsec KMPs are clearly inappropriate to use. So the problem is that the use of IPsec KMPs have their limitations, which require the routers within a network to run IPsec protocol suite. The Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) working group of the IETF was chartered [1] to explore ways to improve security for routing protocols. In order to solve the problem we just mentioned, they are developing KMPs in such a way that they could carry different kinds of payload so that whatever mechanisms the routing protocols are using, the KMP could provide the appropriate solution. Table II shows the work on developing KMPs for routing protocols that occurred within KARP which are not only designed for IPsec. Based on using IKEv2 in GDOI Group key management us-
The use of G-IKEv2 for multicast router key management [8] MaRK Similar to GIKEv2 but has election procedure Multicast Router Key Management Protocol (MaRK) [9] The problem that we are addressing is to formally model and validate these protocols, so that we can make a good evaluation on how secure they are or what problems they have, and then propose a fix for these problems.
Note that the goal of the formal model is to ensure that the security properties of the protocols are present. This is independent of time; questions of performance and/or time dependency must be answers by other approaches, such as simulation or implementation.
IV. SECURITY GOALS
To analyse the security of the KMPs we mentioned above, a set of security goals should be made. Since RKMP, MRKM, and MaRK are proposed by KARP working group, the general routing protocol threats document [12] and KARP threats document [13] have been used as a starting point for establishing our goals.
Since the protocol should resist the attack of adversaries, the following security goals should be met:
• RKMP R-1 Peer authentication, to make sure each peer in the network is valid, mutual authentication must be performed. R-2 Message authentication, which includes origin authentication and integrity authentication. R-3 Confidentiality of RP keys. The RP keys are derived to protect the routing protocols, so they must be kept secret. R-4 Perfect forward security (PFS) and perfect backward security (PBS). If necessary, the network devices may destroy the state associated with the IKEv2 SA then rekey an IKEv2 SA and establish a new equivalent IKEv2 SA. R-5 Protection against replay attacks. If an adversary replays an old message, the system must be able to ignore it. R-6 Resistance to man-in-the-middle attacks. R-7 Usage of strong keys.
• MRKM When MRKM is performing exchanges to distribute keys, there may be two kinds of situation:
1) The router that wants to join the group has no accepted credential. Then GCKS needs to perform GSA AUTH exchange to ensure that router is valid in order to further communicate. 2) The router that wants to join the group is authenticated. The GCKS does not need to perform the authentication procedure. MRKM has two sets of security goals, depending on which case is true. Case 1: M-1 Group member authentication, to make sure all members in the network are valid, GCKS and the router must perform mutual authentication before the router joins the group. M-2 Message authentication, which includes origin authentication and integrity authentication. M-3 Confidentiality of RP keys. The RP keys are derived to protect the routing protocols, so they must be kept secret. M-4 Perfect forward security (PFS) and perfect backward security (PBS). If necessary, a GCKS may need to change the group policy and/or rekey before current keys expire. M-5 Protection against replay attacks. If an adversary replays an old message, the system must be able to ignore it. M-6 Resistance to man-in-the-middle attacks. M-7 Usage of strong keys. Case 2: M*-1 Confidentiality of RP keys. The RP keys are derived to protect the routing protocols, so they must be kept secret. M*-2 Perfect forward security (PFS) and perfect backward security (PBS). If necessary, the network devices may destroy the state associated with the IKEv2 SA then rekey an IKEv2 SA and establish a new equivalent IKEv2 SA. M*-3 Protection against replay attacks. If an adversary replays an old message, the system must be able to ignore it. M*-4 Resistance to man-in-the-middle attacks. M*-5 Usage of strong keys.
• MaRK Ma-1 Authenticity of the GCKS. If an adversary participates into the election procedure, it should not pass the authentication. Ma-2 Authenticity of the initiating routers. The initiating routers need to authenticate to GCKS. Ma-3 Message authentication of the group key management messages, which includes origin authentication and integrity authentication. Ma-4 Confidentiality of RP keys. While routing security does not typically require confidentiality, the key management protocol does because keys are exchanged and these must be protected. Ma-5 Perfect forward security (PFS) and perfect backward security (PBS). The GCKS MUST change the protocol master key if a router was part of the group under the current protocol master key and reboots. Ma-6 Protection against replay attacks. If an adversary replays an old message, the system must be able to ignore it. Ma-7 Resistance to man-in-the-middle attacks. Ma-8 Usage of strong keys.
Peer authentication and origin authentication are two different concepts. Peer authentication focuses on the authenticity of the peer member, while origin authentication tries to find out if the message comes from a valid member. Therefore, we divided them into two security goals.
The security goals listed above can be divided into two categories: those that can be formally proved (i.e., where the analysis performed by AVISPA can be guaranteed) and those that can only be improved by the practice of certain design techniques, but formal proof is impossible.
The things we can prove with AVISPA are properties that depend only on the sequence of messages, i.e., time is not relevant. The other properties are those where time has an effect. For example, the vulnerability of a key depends on the available CPU power, which increases with time. We can formally model the first category but it is not possible to use formal models for the rest.
V. MODELLING OF RKMP, MARK AND MRKM
In order to model and analyse the RKMP, MaRK and MRKM protocols, we designed several scenarios to all kinds of different situations that may occur. Each scenario contains a brief description, a list of roles, and a list of goals.
A. RKMP 1) Scenario 1:
This scenario describes the most basic situation about authentication in the unicast case for the RKMP protocol.
In this scenario we simulated two roles, Alice and Bob. They are trying to communicate with each other and before they started the conversation, it is necessary to authenticate each other and generate a session key for later use. During this procedure, which party starts is not important, so we assume Alice to be the initiator and Bob the responder.
Goal description:
• Secrecy of session key • Authentication on each party HLPSL Code:
• secrecy_of sec_a_SK, sec_b_SK %secrecy_of SK • authentication_on sk1 %Alice authenticates Bob on sk1 • authentication_on sk2 %Bob authenticates Alice on sk2 Goal Mapping: Security goal R-1 (peer authentication) has two components, although each one acts equally in the communication (either of them can start the authentication). The authentication should be performed mutually. As such, AVISPA has two goals authentication on sk1 and authentication on sk2.
Security goal R-2 (message authentication) has two components: authentication of the data origination point and verification of data integrity. Data origin is verified by encrypting the secret keys shared by the entities participating in the communication. The secrecy of these keys is ensured by the security goal R-3. Security goal R-3 (RP key secrecy) is validated by AVISPA goal secrecy of sec a SK, sec b SK.
It is achieved due to the fact that strong authentication is chosen when the two peers perform the IKE INIT exchange.
B. MaRK 1) Scenario 2:
This scenario describes the simplest situation that triggers an election procedure. We assume there are three routers, two members (Alice and Bob) and one GCKS. In this scenario, GCKS stops working. That triggers the election procedure between Alice and Bob.
The election procedure could be divided into three parts:
• The two members announce their own priority by sending it to the other members.
• The one with lower priority starts the IKE SA INIT exchange as we discussed before.
• After the IKE SA INIT, the IKE AUTH exchange will be performed to finish the authentication and generate the session key. There are three roles: Alice, Bob and GCKS. Since the GCKS stopped working in the first place, it actually does not take part in the entire exchange. So we only have Alice and Bob as the two roles to perform the election procedure.
• secrecy_of sec_mem_SK, sec_gcks_SK %secrecy of SK between member and GCKS • authentication_on sk1 %member authenticates GCKS on sk1 • authentication_on sk2 %GCKS authenticates member on sk 2) Scenario 3: This scenario has three routers that communicate with each other. The steps of message exchanges are described below.
• Three routers exchange their own priority.
• The router with highest priority becomes the GCKS, others become members.
• Members try to authenticate GCKS using their public keys. In order to make the election modelling more general, we have three routers communicating in this scenario, R, X and Y. By assigning them different priorities, the three parties will decide their sequences by themselves.
• secrecy_of sec_memx_SK, sec_memy_SK, sec_gcks_SK %shared secrecy among GCKS and other two members • authentication_on sk1
• authentication_on sk2 %mutual authentication on sk1 and sk2 Goal Mapping: Security goals Ma-1 and Ma-2 have two components, GCKS and Group Member (GM). When the election succeeds, GCKS should start the mutual authentication. Since the roles are different, it is better to keep the goals separated. The two authentication goals reflect to AVISPA goals authentication on sk1 and authentication on sk2 in both scenario 2 and scenario 3.
Security goal Ma-3 (message authentication) has two components, authentication of the data origination point and verification of data integrity. Data origin is verified by encrypting the secret keys shared by the entities participating in the communication. The secrecy of these keys is ensured by the security goal Ma-4.
Security goal Ma-4 (RP key secrecy) is validated by AVISPA goal secrecy of sec mem SK, sec gcks SK in scenario 2. AVISPA goals secrecy of sec memx SK, sec memy SK, sec gcks SK are validated in scenario 3. It is achieved by the fact that strong authentication is chosen when the two peers perform the IKE INIT exchange.
C. MRKM 1) Scenario 4:
This scenario models the exchange that enables the group member to register with the key server in order to get the policy, traffic selector, and keys used to communicate with other group members. We divided the exchange into two parts as before.
The first part is IKE SA INIT, which has been used in many protocols as the first step to allow two parties to negotiate cryptographic algorithms, exchange nonces, and perform a Diffie-Hellman exchange [14] .
The second part is G-IKEv2 GSA AUTH exchange, which we already mentioned above.
In this scenario we have one router (Alice) and GCKS, in which Alice has a credential but did not authenticate herself to the GCKS yet. The GCKS knows the group materials and will distribute the keys and policies to Alice once Alice has passed the authentication.
• Secrecy of group key • Authentication on each party HLPSL Code:
• secrecy_of sec_a_SK, sec_g_SK, sec_GK %secrecy of session key and group key • authentication_on sk1 %Alice authenticates GCKS on sk1 • authentication_on sk2 %GCKS authenticates on Alice sk2 2) Scenario 5: Once an IKEv2 SA has been established between a group member and the GCKS, the group member could ask GCKS for the group policy and keys of an additional group using the GSA CLIENT SERVER exchange.
Since this scenario is relatively simple, we only need Alice, which stands for a group member, and GCKS, which represents a key server in this model.
• Secrecy of group key • Authentication on group member HLPSL Code:
• secrecy_of sec_gk %secrecy of group key • authentication_on skey %GCKS authenticates client on skey Goal Mapping:
The security goal M-1 (GM Authentication) has two components, the group member and GCKS. They perform the mutual authentication that was validated by AVISPA goals authentication on sk1 and authentication on sk2 in scenario 4.
Security goal M-2 (message authentication) has two components, authentication of the data origination point and verification of data integrity. Data origin is verified by encrypting the secret keys shared by the entities participating in the communication. The secrecy of these keys is ensured by the security goal M-3.
Security goal M-3 (RP key secrecy) was validated by AVISPA goals secrecy of sec a SK, sec g SK, sec GK in scenario 4. It is achieved by the fact that strong authentication is chosen when the two peers perform the IKE INIT exchange.
Security goal M*-1 (RP keys secrecy) is validated by AVISPA goals secrecy of and sec gk in scenario 5. It is achieved by the fact that both parties have reliable credentials to confirm each peer's authenticity.
VI. VALIDATION
We use AVISPA [2] to validate RKMP, MaRK and MRKM based on the scenarios. AVISPA provides a push-button tool as well as an industrial-strength technology for the analysis of large-scale Internet security-sensitive protocols and applications. Although AVISPA has four back-ends, only two of them are adopted in our experiments, namely OFMC and CL-AtSe. CL-AtSe is the back-end that translates a protocol specification into constraints and finds possible attacks on the protocol, while OFMC is the back-end that has the highest speed in finding attacks on a protocol. The other two backends, SATMC and TA4SP, are not designed to validate our security goals. The validation results show that all three protocols meet the security requirements. As an example, the results of MaRK protocol scenario 2 are "SAFE" for both OFMC and CL-AtSe back-ends. The scenario simulation is shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 . In Figure 1 we are using CL-AtSe to translate the scenario into a set of constraints that can be effectively used to find attacks on protocols. The validation in Figure 2 uses a number of symbolic techniques to represent the state-space in order to find the attack traces.
Since all scenarios are using the same back-ends to do the validation we believe the processes of other ones are similar to scenario 2. The full results are given in detail in [15] .
VII. CONCLUSION
To define what is meant by "security" of routing protocol exchanges, we first enumerated the desirable security properties for routing protocols, and separated them into those that can be formally validated, and those that cannot. We then designed a scenario for RKMP to model its peer authentication. Although the message exchanges of RKMP have the same structure as IKEv2, they have different payloads. This modeling process allows us to confirm the validity of our approach.
MaRK, on the other hand, defines a new election system that gives MaRK the ability to self-heal and to tolerate errors when the Group Controller and Key Server (GCKS) fails, which makes the routing group Autonomous. Since this election procedure has never been analyzed, we designed two scenarios to model the election procedure when it is between two routers and when it is among three routers. We assigned the priorities to these routers by randomly generating the numbers and used the same technique to mutually authenticate the GCKS and the members.
After the election, there are two kinds of members to which the GCKS could distribute keys: authenticated members and unauthenticated members. One of the aspects of security is that the GCKS must not distribute keys to the unauthenticated members. Based on those two kinds of members, we designed two scenarios for MRKM to test its security. MRKM is an extension to G-IKEv2, which in turn is an updating of GDOI from IKE exchanges to IKEv2 exchanges. We demonstrated that MRKM is able to provide authenticity, integrity and authority when it is doing the key management for multicast situations.
We then analyzed the five scenarios above using the AVISPA modelling tool. The result formally proved that the key management protocols RKMP, MaRK, and MRKM have the necessary security properties, including authentication, confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection. They meet our security requirements.
